

Another response of neighboring governments has been militarization of their borders. With U.S. support, the Brazilians have developed Plan Cobra, to increase military presence on the border. Critics are also concerned that the \$1.7 billion dollar System for Vigilance of the Amazon (SIVAM), initially designed to detect environmental damage, has been creeping towards counternarcotics operations.¹² Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela have also increased troop strength along the border. At the same time, U.S. military presence in the region is greater than ever, with expanded training missions and a growing number of bases, all with counternarcotics operations as their fundamental mission. [See "A New World Order," p.14]

While there are significant differences among the countries in the region, all face severe problems with deteriorating economies, weak democratic institutions and increasing violence and civil unrest. Entrenched poverty and falling standards of living have lowered expectations for reform. The worsening economy in the United States, the Andean region's largest trading partner, and the crises in the Brazilian and Mexican economies have sent shock waves throughout the Andes. Rural economies have been particularly hard hit. The dramatic decline in coffee prices, from three dollars to less than 50 cents a pound since 1997, are indicative of the challenges facing these export-based economies.¹³ Drug trafficking profits have distorted legal economies in bust-and-boom cycles, and while

State Department officials continue to herald the success of alternative development programs in Bolivia, local analysts point to the ongoing failure of these projects to establish sustainable market outlets for legal products.

Coca production, after declining for several years, has begun to increase again in Peru and Bolivia as desperate farmers return to the only crop with a market. Protests against the current Bolivian eradication policy turned violent in April; at least nine people died. New Bolivian President Jorge Quiroga—President Hugo Banzer resigned in August to undergo treatment for cancer—seems unlikely to shift Bolivia's drug policy: Educated in the United States, Quiroga was the architect of the infamous "Plan Dignidad," the eradication program that militarized the coca-producing regions.

With the full scope and reach of the U.S. war on terrorism still unclear, foreign policy predictions remain difficult. The focus on the Middle East could provide the Andes with a welcome reprieve from the heavy hand of U.S. military intervention in the name of the war on drugs. Much more likely, however, is expanded support for intelligence operations and an increasing mix of counterdrug and counterterrorism operations. The economic and social challenges facing the Andes have long been alternately exacerbated or ignored by U.S. policymakers. The post-September 11 turn to the new war on terrorism is unlikely to change that trend. ■

TERROR'S LATIN AMERICAN PROFILE

What—according to U.S. officials—is the face of terrorism in Latin America? What role is Latin America likely to play in a world-wide, U.S.-directed "war on terrorism"? The hunt for associates of Osama bin Laden was extended to Latin America almost immediately after the September 11 attacks. There were raids and arrests in Mexico, Brazil, Peru and a number of other countries; the most dramatic were in Paraguay, where masked policemen conducted dragnets in the markets of Ciudad del Este, a town in the triborder region where Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil meet. The region is notorious as a center of drug and contraband trade, and last year's U.S. State Department Report on Terrorism cited the operation of "extremist religious groups" in the triborder area which reportedly posed "a terrorist concern." The same area had earlier been the focus of Argentine investigations into a bombing of the Israeli embassy and another of the Jewish Mutual Aid Society, both in Buenos Aires. The triborder region is home to large and well-established Middle Eastern and Arabic communities; as elsewhere in Latin America, these communities bore the brunt of the terrorist hunt, which so far seems to have

BY JOANN KAWELL

netted just a few solid suspects but many immigrants and travellers whose papers were not in order.

Although the focus of U.S. interest is now on groups and individuals tied to bin Laden's al Qaeda or loosely allied Muslim groups which operate internationally, Latin America was, in fact, singled out in last year's State Department report as the region of the world with "the largest increase in terrorist attacks from the previous year." It achieved this ranking only because Colombia's National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas stepped up their bombings of oil pipelines in that country, and the State Department classified these as "international terrorist attacks." The ELN and three other Latin American guerrilla groups—Colombia's FARC and Peru's Shining Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)—were included on the State Department's worldwide list of "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" issued in April of this year; Colombia's AUC paramilitary group was appended to the list just days before September 11, bringing the worldwide total of groups listed to 28.¹ Cuba continued to be one of the seven governments designated by the State Department as "state sponsors of international terror-

ism”—the others being Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea and Sudan.

The significance of these “terrorist” labels for future U.S. actions in Latin America remains to be seen. President Bush’s declaration, in the wake of the attacks in the United States, that “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” is one indication that the United States wishes to create a new kind of bipolar world, in which the epithet of choice for those not 100% “with the United States” will be “terrorist” instead of “Communist.” That could provide Washington with a handy pretext for intensifying campaigns against leftist guerrilla groups and Cuba, and for expanding a war on drugs in which the enemy has, since the 1980s, been branded as “narcoterrorists.”

But, as it has been used until now, the terrorist label may prove to be too all-encompassing: How long can an even moderately coherent campaign be mounted against a list of enemies that includes the FARC, which aims at overthrowing the current Colombian establishment, as well as the AUC, which aims to protect the Colombian status quo? Though the State Department list has some notable oversights—no pro-U.S. government, however notorious its use of violence against civilian populations, is listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, for instance—the inclusion of the AUC is not completely an aberration: The current list also includes Kach and Kahane Chai, radical Jewish groups dedicated to restoring Israel to its “biblical borders,” as well as the radical Muslim groups Hamas and Hizballah, dedicated to Israel’s destruction.

Terrorism, understood as the purposeful use of violence against non-combatants, has long been used for such opposing goals. The anti-British and anti-Arab campaign waged by Menachem Begin’s Irgun toward the founding of Israel was as reliant on purposeful attacks on civilian targets as are those of certain pro-Palestinian groups today. Thus the State Department list is necessarily something of a grab bag; “terrorism,” unlike Communism, is not an ideology or a political system but a strategy or tactic which can be used toward a wide range of political ends.

It was not until the Reagan era, when the Cold War was drawing to a close and “the international Communist conspiracy” was growing threadbare as a means of winning U.S. public support for intervention abroad, that right-wing theorists like Michael Ledeen and Claire Sterling began to win official support for their view that “international terrorism” constituted a threat

analogous to “international Communism”—that is that “terrorists” of different political stripes and religious creeds were working intimately together toward the downfall of the United States. During the Reagan years, the simple term “terrorism”—without other identifying national or ideological markers—became short-hand for any perceived threat of violence directed against U.S. interests.

But if public concern about Communism was waning, concern about the U.S. “drug problem” was at a peak, and so in the same era drug trafficking was rhetorically linked to this “terrorist” conspiracy as one of the key means by which “terrorists” were striving to destroy the United States and its international allies. And because the main drug of concern was cocaine, and cocaine is made exclusively in Latin America, Latin America was soon being described as a hotbed of “terrorism.”

In 1984, in a speech to the Organization of American States, Secretary of State George Shultz warned newly resurgent Latin American democracies that they would have to vigilantly “struggle” against “terrorism and drugs.” The same year Washington’s Ambassador to Colombia Lewis Tambs used the term “narcoguerrilla”—soon to mutate to

“narcoterrorist”—to refer to an alleged alliance between Colombian insurgents and the Colombian groups that run the world cocaine trade. Though both groups earn income from various aspects of the drug trade, the two groups were (and are) actually sworn enemies.

From the point of view of members of Congress and drug control officials trying to win administration attention—and resources—for international drug control programs, “narcoterrorism” was a boon: It elevated drug control to the level of a key foreign policy issue. In 1986, President Reagan signed a secret directive which designated the international drug trade as a national security concern. This opened the way for U.S. military involvement in the drug war, and provided a ready-made mission for the Pentagon a few years later when the end of the Cold War effectively put an end to its old one.

Now the United States faces the real and concrete threat of terrorist attacks inside its own borders and, in response, the Bush administration has launched a new war. How will this war affect the U.S. stance toward various Latin American actors previously dubbed terrorist? The authors of this year’s State Department terrorism report could find no actions by the Peruvian groups worth noting since 1996, in the case of MRTA,

**The terror-drug linkage
ensures that drug warriors
still have a mission in a world
in which “terror” is the
primary U.S. target.**

and 1990 in the case of Shining Path, although both groups continue to have a small-scale presence in Peru, and Shining Path has mounted occasional attacks. But in the wake of the September 11 attacks, a year-old video surfaced in Peru in which Vladimiro Montesinos, the now jailed former intelligence chief, made vague references to U.S. concerns about the presence of bin Laden associates in Lima. Peru expert Coletta Youngers reports that in response, "the Peruvian government came out to assure everyone that there was no terrorist presence" in Peru, but she predicts that concerns about this,

combined with allegations of increased Shining Path activity in some parts of the country, might hinder the work of the commission now investigating human rights abuses during the Fujimori government. And, she says, "we now run the risk of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies coming in again and working with the new Peruvian intelligence agency that replaced the Fujimori-era SIN, and with police and military intelligence units. It is far from clear that the existing units have had human rights violators or Fujimoristas purged from their ranks."

Colombia watchers differed widely in their assessment—as of early October—of the possible effects there of the newly declared international war on terrorism. Marc Chernick believes that, with official attention focused on global networks formed by Middle Eastern groups, Washington is far less likely to get involved in a major effort against the FARC in the name of either the drug war or counterinsurgency. "The heyday of Colombia as a policy focal point and the drug war as focal point is over," he says, but adds that "this change in U.S. focus could generate new urgency on the part of some Colombian officials to push the peace process forward. At the same time, other Colombian leaders, long opposed to the peace process, will try to manipulate the new international situation to bolster greater counterterrorism policies and escalated war."

Nazih Richani, by contrast, thinks the international situation could provide even more impetus for escalating the drug war and folding it into counterinsurgency efforts in the name of the war on terrorism. He cautions that since proposed anti-terrorist legislation would give



Paraguayan Special Forces officers check the identification of Arab merchants in Ciudad del Este, September 21, 2001, as part of an international investigation.

the United States more latitude to work with "thugs" in the name of fighting terrorism, Washington could decide to ignore or remove the paramilitary AUC's terrorist designation and instead work more openly with the group in the name of expediency.

Winifred Tate, a contributor to this issue, reports that even before September 11, conservative policy analysts in the United States had called for negotiations with paramilitary leaders, or the legalization of paramilitary groups. She cites the Rand Corporation's recent report which concluded that the *rondas campesinas* (peasant security patrols) from Peru could be a useful model; according to the Rand authors, "in the Colombian situation, a network of properly supervised self-defense organizations could give the state a better handle on the activities of self-organized local groups."² But Tate says that such suggestions "ignore the fact that Colombian paramilitary groups were legal for much of Colombian history, and government support simply facilitated the expansion of illegal groups involved in egregious human rights violations."³

For the moment, U.S. State Department officials continue to publicly stress that the FARC, ELN and AUC are all "terrorist." On October 15, the department released a statement condemning the AUC's recent massacre of 24 civilians in the town of Buga. Francis Taylor, the State Department's anti-terrorism coordinator, told the press after a meeting the same day at the Organization of American States that all three Colombian groups "will receive the same treatment as any other terrorist group in terms of our interest in pursuing them and putting an end to their terrorist activities."

Taylor did not rule out the use of military force in the "anti-terror" campaign in Latin America; he said the campaign would make use of the region's intelligence and law enforcement resources and "where appropriate—as we are doing in Afghanistan—the use of military power." But the question remains: What kind of campaign, military or otherwise, could be waged simultaneously against FARC and ELN insurgents and the AUC, which is both anti-insurgent and supported by some elements of the Colombian Armed Forces?

The case of Cuba is even more contradictory. Cuba expert Philip Brenner reports that after September 11 some members of Congress tried to have Cuba removed from the "terrorist" list, but this was stymied by the Cubans in Congress. According to Brenner, "There is a recognition that Cuba is something of an anomaly on the list, that the reasons it ended up on the list are very different from the kind of terrorism that blows up the World Trade Center." Cuba analyst and former diplomat Wayne Smith noted in a commentary that "Justifications put forward by the State Department are unconvincing. We are told, for example, that Cuba harbors Basque separatists. Not really. There are a number of them living in Cuba, yes, but they are there as the result of an agreement between the Spanish and Cuban governments. Cuba is not harboring them and they are not engaged in terrorist activity of any kind." Smith goes on to say that, "Cuba did immediately condemn the attacks on September 11 and express solidarity with the American people. Yet, Cuba is on the list while Afghanistan is not."

In a September 25 open letter, Cuba activists and scholars also noted Fidel Castro's denunciation of the attacks on the United States and his declared willingness to cooperate with Washington in combatting terrorism. "In this new world context dominated by the struggle against terrorism, Cuba clearly will not be an unquestioning ally, but it need not be an enemy," the letter said. "Indeed, given the challenges we now face, it is not in the interests of the United States to treat it as an enemy." But the trend, for the moment is in the opposite direction. Before September 11, the U.S. Congress had taken some steps toward easing the ban on travel to Cuba, but according to Brenner, "What's for certain is that all movement toward relaxing the ban is now stopped for the foreseeable future."

Even though Venezuela does not appear on the State Department terrorist list, Kate Doyle, also a contributor

to this *NACLA Report*, points out that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez's relations with Libya's Moammar Qaddafi and Iraq's Saddam Hussein have been a past source of friction with the United States. Doyle thinks that, "despite U.S. reliance on Venezuelan oil, Washington may move toward a more confrontational stance with Venezuela if the Bush administration adopts a 'zero tolerance' approach to what it perceives as support for terrorism."

The Bush administration has already hinted that Nicaragua might be added to the list of nations that sponsor terrorism and face possible U.S. sanctions if Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega wins the November 4 presidential election. In an October 4 statement, the State Department listed "grave reservations" about Sandinista party

members supposed ties to Libya, Iraq, the FARC and Basque separatists.

Meanwhile, the "narcoterrorist" designation seems unlikely to disappear. In recent weeks, both British and U.S. officials have denounced al Qaeda and the Taliban for allegedly using profits from opium production to finance terrorist activities. New DEA administrator Asa Hutchinson told Congress in October that international drug trafficking groups are a "merger of international organized crime, drugs and terror." Many "terrorist" groups undoubtedly do earn income from some kind of participation in the international drug market—as the man once said about robbing banks, that's where the money is. Linking the two threats together in this way, however, does little to illuminate the complex realities of either phenomenon. For instance: CIA-supported groups working to topple the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan in the 1980s—the same groups with which bin Laden was originally allied—were heavily involved in opium production. By contrast, the UN earlier this year praised the Taliban for eradicating the opium-poppy crop in areas under Taliban control—though the group now threatens to permit new production in response to the U.S. attacks on their territory. What the rhetorical terror-drug linkage does do is ensure that U.S. drug warriors will continue to have a mission in a world where "terror" is now seen as the primary U.S. target. And the link helps prop up a simplistic worldview in which it's not necessary to look at U.S. society or policies to find the root causes of the problems that afflict the United States, but merely to brand them as evils spread by those who aren't unquestioningly "with the United States." ■

**How will the U.S. War on
Terrorism affect the U.S.
stance towards various Latin
American actors previously
dubbed terrorist?**

A New New World Order?

1. Transcript PBS, "The News Hour With Jim Lehrer," September 11, 2001.
2. Transcript of a Department of Defense News Briefing, September 12, 2001.
3. Lizette Alvarez, "Spying Terrorists and Thwarting Them Gains New Urgency," *The New York Times*, September 14, 2001.
4. Mark Benjamin, "Assassination Ban Debated," *United Press International*, September 18, 2001.

Back to the Future

1. Christopher Marquis, "Bush's Latin America Nominations Reopen Wounds," *The New York Times*, August 1, 2001.
2. Arms Trade Resource Center, "Current Update," January 31, 2001, <<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/updates/013101.html>>.
3. Associated Press, "Senate Panel OKs U.N. Nominee," September 13, 2001; Gary Cohn and Ginger Thompson, 4-part series in *The Baltimore Sun* on June 11, 13, 15 and 18, 1995; Leo Valladares Lanza and Susan Peacock, *In Search of Hidden Truths: An Interim Report on Declassification by the National Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras* (Honduras: 1998); Center for Justice and Human Rights Law (CEJIL) and Human Rights Watch/Americas, *The Facts Speak for Themselves: The Preliminary Report on Disappearances for the National Commissioner for the Protection of Human Rights in Honduras* (Washington, D.C. 1995); Central Intelligence Agency, "Selected Issues Relating to CIA Activities in Honduras in the 1980s" (CIA Office of the Inspector General, August 27, 1997), posted on the Web-site of the National Security Archive at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/latin_america/honduras/>.
4. Julien Borger, "Cold Warriors on Parade as Bush Puts Clock Back in Latin America," *The Guardian Weekly*, July 5, 2001; Associated Press, "Helms, Critic Meet in Mexico," April 18, 2001.
5. Peter Kornbluh, "Bush's Contra Buddies," *The Nation*, May 7, 2001; see also Institute for Policy Studies website, <<http://www.ips-dc.org/stoptotto/quotes.html>>, for a selection of public statements made by Reich.

Refueling a Doomed War on Drugs

1. This position is well captured in Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001).
2. William M. LeoGrande and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "Two Wars or One? Drugs, Guerrillas, and Colombia's New Violencia," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2000, pp. 1-11.

The Neoliberal Disorder

1. While my concern here is primarily with the way neoliberalism prescribes "free trade" for the operation of the international economy, the policies and ideology of neoliberalism are broader: "The economic policy that became dominant in most of the world during the final decades of the 20th century has given greater and greater rein to unregulated private decision-making. The policy calls for reducing the economic roles of government in providing social welfare, in managing economic activity at the aggregate and sectoral levels, and in regulating international commerce. The ideas at the foundation of this policy are not new. They come directly from the classical economic liberalism that emerged in the nineteenth century and that proclaimed 'the market' as the proper guiding instrument by which people should organize their economic lives. As a new incarnation of these old ideas, this ascendant economic policy is generally called 'neoliberalism.'" See Arthur MacEwan, *Neo-Liberalism or Democracy? Economic Strategy, Markets, and Alternatives for the 21st Century* (London and New York: Zed Books and St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 4.
2. Statement of the Honorable Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on President Bush's Trade Agenda, March 7, 2001.
3. "Bush Moves Against Steel Imports; Trade Tensions are Likely to Arise," *The New York Times*, June 6, 2001.
4. "Steel Import Curbs Weighed," *The Washington Post*, March 8, 2001. Zoellick did avow that any such protection for the steel industry should be temporary and would depend on a commitment from the industry and unions to "restructure" in ways that would make U.S. firms more competitive—which would likely mean gutting existing union contracts. The emerging policy of the Bush administration with regard to steel imports has been pushed by a large bloc in Congress; more than 200 members of the U.S. House of Representatives—including members of both political parties—have sponsored the "Steel Revitalization Act," which would direct the president to impose quotas, tariff surcharges, or other measures on "illegally" dumped steel and to negotiate agreements that restrain imports of steel products. See "Lawmakers Seek Help for Steel Companies," *The Columbus Dispatch*, June 3, 2001.
5. The settlement of the U.S.-E.U. banana dispute at the end of April 2001, however, did not leave all U.S. firms happy. While Chiquita generally expressed satisfaction with the agreement, Dole Food Company, also a U.S.-based firm, criticized the agreement as favoring its competitor. See "Dole Says Trade Accord on Bananas Favors Rival," *The New York Times*, April 14, 2001. Also see "Banana Dispute Resolved as E.U.-Ecuador Reach Agreement," *Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest*, Vol. 5, No. 16, May 1, 2001.
6. See "U.S. Soybean Assn to Ask for \$1.65 Bill in Aid," *High Plains Journal*, March 21, 2001; "Rice Farmers Say Their Future Depends on More Government Aid," *The Associated Press State and Local Wire*, March 21, 2001; "U.S. Will Buy Back Corn Seed," *The Washington Post*, March 8, 2001. This bailout, it should be noted, had bipartisan support in Congress. 7. The president of the Biotechnology Industry Organization has commented, "Generally, we're very positive about how this administration is developing its policies and personnel." See "Biotech Largely Pleased by Bush," *The Boston Herald*, February 26, 2001.
8. "U.S. Rebuts Charges that IPR Panel Attacks Brazil's AIDS Policy," *Inside U.S. Trade*, February 9, 2001.
9. "Biggest Obstacle to Selling Trade Pact: Sovereignty," *The New York Times*, April 23, 2001.
10. "Brazil Flexes New Muscle in Another Trade Fight," *The New York Times*, March 27, 2001.
11. "Brazilian Minister Resists Speeding Up FTAA, Emphasizes Mercosur," *Inside U.S. Trade*, March 9, 2001.
12. Under "Trade Promotion Authority," Congress would commit itself to consider without amendment trade agreements negotiated by the administration. Under these arrangements, Congress could accept or reject the agreements, but could not amend them. With regard to the FTAA, other governments have indicated that they would not go forward with negotiations unless Congress makes this commitment.

13. The matter continually arose, for example, in controversy over a provisional trade agreement with Jordan. The Jordan agreement as drafted includes labor and environmental provisions, and leading Democrats claim "that fast-track must include enforceable labor and environmental standards as one of the U.S. negotiating objectives." See "Levin Says Road to Fast-Track Goes Through Jordan Agreement," *Inside U.S. Trade*, March 9, 2001.
14. "Loft Sees Fast-track as Early as Fall, Including Labor and Environment," *Inside U.S. Trade*, March 9, 2001.
15. "E.U. & U.S. Meet On Trade As U.S. Trade Policy Takes Shape," *Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest*, March 13, 2001. I might note in passing that environmental and labor provisions are meaningful only in fact they do in some way impede trade; otherwise they are unnecessary.
16. "House Leaders Urge Halt to Business, Labor, Environment Effort," *Inside U.S. Trade*, February 16, 2001.
17. The data are from Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., "U.S. Multinational Companies, Operations in 1998," *Survey of Current Business*, July 2000. U.S. firms' affiliates in Mexico, which accounted for 28% of the sales of their affiliates operating in the region, sent 40% of their sales back to the United States. These data, for Mexico of the whole region, do not tell us much about the problems that U.S. workers face as a result of import competition or about environmental damage associated with international commerce. Those issues are not the same as the direct and immediate concerns of the largest U.S. internationally operating firms. The popular image of those firms as heavily dependent on low-wage foreign labor is understandable because of the importance of low-wage-based imports of highly visible consumer goods (e.g., clothing) and the dramatic problems of many U.S. workers. Likewise, the popular image of these firms as seeking havens safe from environmental regulation probably arises from some highly dramatic anecdotes. These problems are real, and are consequences of the way the international economy is organized under the aegis of U.S. business. Nonetheless, as these data suggest, U.S. business is often not the direct culprit.
18. "House Leaders Urge Halt to Business Labor, Environment Effort," *Inside U.S. Trade*, February 16, 2001.
19. In the Metalclad and Methanex cases, firms have used Chapter 11 of NAFTA to sue governments over environmental regulations. The Metalclad case involves a California-based company in a suit against local regulations in Mexico. See, for example, "Mexico to Pay Pounds 11m Damages in NAFTA Case," *Financial Times* (London), September 1, 2000. In the Methanex case, a Canadian firm has sued the government of California for placing a ban on the use of its gasoline additive product MTBE. While Chapter 11 does provide extensive protections for firms, the courts have not always given them what they want. See, for example, "Ruling in Canada Strikes at Companies' NAFTA Trade Suits," *Los Angeles Times*, May 5, 2001.

Immigration Policy in Flux

1. *Beyond the Census: Hispanics and an American Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: NCLR, 2001).
2. Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, September 7, 2001.
3. See Michael Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, *Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1994) and *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999).
4. Michael Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, *Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight*.
5. An alarming number of deaths take place each year at the U.S.-Mexico border. Since the initiation of Operation Gatekeeper, a major border-control initiative in the mid-1990s, at least 1,700 migrants have lost their lives crossing rivers, deserts, and mountains entering the United States. See Wayne A. Cornelius, "The Efficacy and 'Unintended' Consequences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy, 1993-2000," monograph, 2001.

Into the Andean Quagmire

1. Washington Office on Latin America, *Clear and Present Dangers: The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes* (Washington D.C., 1991).
2. Washington Office on Latin America, p. 12.
3. Concern with the Colombian military's human rights record (and their refusal to sign an agreement to honor human rights legislation) and the Samper administration's corruption interrupted the cash flow to the army. The Colombian National Police, benefited from Congressional Republicans' enchantment with chief José Rosso Serrano.
4. Acción Andina and Transnational Institute, *The Drug War In The Skies, The U.S. Air Bridge Denial Strategy: The Success of a Failure* (Cochabamba, May 1999).
5. Carlos Castaño interview. He says they finance 60% of their operations by taxing drug production and trafficking.
6. Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001).
7. Gustavo Gallon, "Human Rights: A Path to Democracy and Peace in Colombia," presented at the Seminar on Colombia, Notre Dame University, March 26-27, 2001.
8. Hiram Ruiz, "The Crisis of Internal Displacement," *Crimes of War Magazine*, August 2001.
9. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), "Observations of Counter-narcotics Aid to Colombia," GAO/NSIAD-91-29, September 18, 1991; 24; GAO, "Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts," GAO/NSIAD-97-75, February 1997; GAO, "Delays in Obtaining State Department Records Relating to Colombia," GAO/T-NSIAD-97-202, July 9, 1997; 2-3; GAO, "Military Training: U.S. Management and Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange Training," GAO/NSIAD-99-173, July 1999; GAO, "Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce," GAO-01-26, October 2000, p. 14.
10. Gerardo Rivera, "Colombia's Enduring Drug War," on Dateline NBC, August 31, 2001.
11. Axel Bugge, "America's Defense Chiefs Have Eyes on Colombia," Reuters, October 16, 2000.
12. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, "Brazil Special Report: Drug War Replaces Cold War," available on the web at <http://www.public-int.org/story_06_071201.htm>.
13. "Economic grind drives Peru coffee farmers to coca," Reuters, September 5, 2001.

Terror's Latin American Profile

1. A revised State Department list, released October 5, 2001, recertified 26 of 28 groups previously on the list, combined two groups, Kahane Chai and Kach, into one, and added the AUC for the first time.
2. Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001), p. 60.
3. Washington Office on Latin America, *Losing Ground: Human Rights Defenders Under Attack*, (Washington, D.C., 1997).